NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 23 | Issue 1

Article 12

3-1-2019

An Attempt to Negate Iranian Sanctions: How
Special Purpose Vehicles May Be the EU’s Last
Hope to Keep the JCPOA Alive
Alexandria ter Avest

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Alexandria ter Avest, An Attempt to Negate Iranian Sanctions: How Special Purpose Vehicles May Be the EU’s Last Hope to Keep the JCPOA
Alive, 23 N.C. Banking Inst. 181 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol23/iss1/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

AN ATTEMPT TO NEGATE IRANIAN SANCTIONS: HOW
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES MAY BE THE EU’S LAST
HOPE TO KEEP THE JCPOA ALIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. sanctions have had a palpable effect on Iran.1 Iran’s crude
oil exports have plummeted,2 international companies forfeited their
business agreements with Tehran months before the sanctions even took
effect, and international financial entities are cutting ties with the Islamic
Republic.3 However, European leaders are actively fighting to keep the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) intact, with the hope that
their efforts will keep Persia clear of nuclear weapons.4
EU tactics have primarily been centered around protecting Iranian-affiliated entities from November 2018’s wave of secondary sanctions.5 The sanctions forced countries and companies to make a choice
between working with Iran or doing business with the financial institutions and markets of the United States.6 Most companies are currently
choosing to fall in line with the United States, in spite of the initial protections and U.S. financial institution aversion strategies that the EU has

1. Clifford Krauss, Trump Hit Iran With Oil Sanctions. So Far, They’re Working, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/business/energy-environment/iran-oil-sanctions.html.
2. Julian Lee, What’s Not to Like About Trump’s Iran Oil Sanctions?, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 30, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-09-30/what-snot-to-like-about-trump-iran-oil-sanctions-100-oil.
3. Ellen R. Wald, 10 Companies Leaving Iran as Trump’s Sanctions Close in, FORBES
(June 6, 2018, 3:14 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2018/06/06/10-companies-leaving-iran-as-trumps-sanctions-close-in/#6fd5fe14c90f.
4. Steven Erlanger, As U.S. Sanctions on Iran Kick in, Europe Looks for a Work
Around, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/europe/usiran-sanctions-europe.html.
5. Marheen Khan, EU Launches Counter Measures Against US Sanctions on Iran, FIN.
TIMES
(Aug.
6,
2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/be32d010-9973-11e8-97025946bae86e6d.
6. Krauss, supra note 1.
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proposed.7 However, the EU is not yet out of options.8 It is possible that
the recent EU-backed creation of a Special Purpose Vehicle (“SPV”) may
effectively delay, or entirely prevent, the current impending demise of the
JCPOA.9
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II details the background of
the JCPOA and reports the U.S. sanctions currently in place against
Iran.10 Part III describes the objectives of the EU in pursuing its initial
approach to lessen the impact of U.S. sanctions.11 Part IV discusses why
the three main pillars of the EU’s initial strategy to salvage the JCPOA
failed.12 Part V describes the recently announced SPV and how SPVs
may be the EU’s best option moving forward.13 Part VI concludes this
Note by describing the consequences of a financial system that avoids
U.S. markets.14
II. THE JCPOA AND RE-IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST
IRAN
In May of 2018, the Trump Administration announced that the
United States would withdraw from an international agreement with Iran,
the JCPOA.15 The JCPOA, otherwise known as the Iranian Nuclear Deal,
was formed on July 14, 2015 and signed by Britain, China, Germany,
France, Russia, the United States, and Iran.16 The success of the JCPOA
itself was conditioned on a bargain: Iran agreed to “verifiably scale

7. Krauss, supra note 1.
8. See Esfandyar Batmanghelidj & Axel Hellman, How Europe Could Blunt U.S. Iran

Sanctions Without Washington Lifting a Finger, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 3, 2018, 8:54 AM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/03/how-europe-can-blunt-u-s-iran-sanctions-withoutwashington-raising-a-finger-humanitarian-spv (describing various ways SPVs could be used
to combat U.S. sanctions against Iran).
9. Id.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part VI.
15. See Donald J. Trump, Pres. of the U.S., Remarks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (May 8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action [hereinafter Trump’s Remarks].
16. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA].
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back”17 its nuclear development capabilities if the international community removed some of the economic penalties placed on the country.18
After the JCPOA was implemented, Iran began to benefit from
increased access to the global economy.19 The International Monetary
Fund (“IMF”) reported that in 2016, Iran’s GDP grew by 12.5%.20 Oil
exports in the country also began to rise.21 Iran had exported around 1.1
million barrels of oil per day before the JCPOA, but by early 2018 the
Islamic Republic was estimated to have more than doubled their daily oil
exportation.22 Additionally, the JCPOA increased employment in Iran,
providing hope to Iranians for a better future.23
Though economic conditions were improving, Iran’s growth under the JCPOA was overall less than what the Iranian government initially expected.24 The JCPOA lifted certain sanctions against Iran, but
some of “the most disruptive banking restrictions remained in place.”25
The U.S. financial system was still unable to engage with Iran, and many
major European banks refused to work within the Islamic Republic given
the consequences that could result from violating the sanctions that were
still enforceable.26 The 2016 U.S. presidential election also limited potential economic growth in Iran.27 Republicans made clear their opposition to the JCPOA.28 International businesses capable of working within
17. JCPOA, supra note 16.
18. ESFANDYAR BATMANGHELIDJ & AXEL HELLMAN, EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP NETWORK,

EUROPE, IRAN AND ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY: A NEW BANKING ARCHITECTURE IN RESPONSE
TO US SANCTIONS NETWORK 4-5 (2018) [hereinafter A New Banking Architecture].
19. Amir Paivar, Nuclear Deal: Is Iran’s Economy Better off Now, BBC NEWS (May 4,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43975498.
20. Id.
21. See id. (suggesting that initial growth reported by the IMF was all due to increase in
oil exportation in the country).
22. Id.
23. See Negar Habibi, How the US Withdrawal From the Iran Nuclear Deal Will Affect
Iran’s Economy, THE CONVERSATION (May 11, 2018. 8:44 AM), http://theconversation.com/how-the-us-withdrawal-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal-will-affect-irans-economy96476 (“[T]he deal did have some major effects on Iran’s economy. It resulted in a doubling
of Iran’s oil exports, helped stabilise the foreign exchange market, created jobs and – most
importantly – optimism to the overall trend of the economy.”).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Nora Kelly, Where the 2016 Candidates Stand on the Iranian Nuclear Deal,
ATLANTIC (Sep. 1, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/where-the2016-candidates-stand-on-the-iran-nuclear-deal/448380/ (describing how the 2016 presidential candidates would respond to or alter the JCPOA if elected to serve as President of the
United States).

184

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 23

the Islamic Republic were concerned about investing too many resources
in Iran due to the potential impact of a Republican administration, and
these concerns were amplified a couple of years later by the rhetoric of
the Trump campaign.29
Despite these concerns, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(“IAEA”) has consistently confirmed that Iran has remained compliant
with the standards set by the nuclear agreement.30 In spite of this verified
compliance, the Trump Administration followed through with its campaign promise31 and withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in hope
of making a new, more restrictive agreement with Iran.32 The Trump Administration believes the JCPOA does not entirely deter Iran from engaging in nuclear activity.33 Its hope is to find a more permanent solution to
prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons in the future.34 The Trump
Administration seeks a new deal that would require Iran to abandon its
ballistic missile development program and cease the funding of militant
groups that the United States classifies as terrorist organizations.35
U.S. sanctions lifted under the JCPOA were re-introduced, and
additional economic penalties were devised.36 Sanctions against Iran
came in two waves, or wind-down periods, set by the U.S. Department of
Treasury.37 The wind-down periods allowed both American and foreign

29. See Habibi, supra note 23 (discussing how U.S. politics impacted business decision
of whether or not to invest in Iran).
30. See Press Release, IAEA Director General, Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)
(Nov. 12, 2018) (describing Iran’s compliance with standards set by the JCPOA).
31. Trump’s Remarks, supra note 15.
32. Nicolas Miller, Trump Wants to Wring a ‘Better Deal’ from Iran. Here’s Why That’s
So Unlikely, WASH. POST (May 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/05/08/trump-wants-to-wring-a-better-deal-from-iran-heres-why-thats-so-unlikely/?utm_term=.2bb56db1cb45.
33. Trump’s Remarks, supra note 15.
34. See Trump’s Remarks, supra note 15 (“The agreement was so poorly negotiated that
even if Iran fully complies, the regime can still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in just a
short period of time.”).
35. See Trump’s Remarks, supra note 15 (“Not only does the deal fail to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but it also fails to address the regime’s development of ballistic missiles that
could deliver nuclear warheads . . . [T]he deal does nothing to constrain Iran’s destabilizing
activities . . . .”).
36. Rick Gladstone, Iran Sanctions Explained: US Goals, and the View from Tehran,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/middleeast/iransanctions-explained.html.
37. Id.
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entities time to withdraw their businesses and pull their money out of Iran
before the sanctions took effect.38
The first wave of sanctions, implemented in August 2018, targeted the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the government of Iran, Iran’s trade in gold or precious metals, transactions related
to the purchase or sale of Iranian rials, the maintenance of significant
funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran, and Iran’s automotive sector.39 The second wave of sanctions, implemented in November 2018,
focused on Iran’s oil exports by blocking international dealings with Iranian banks.40 Sanctions on oil-related transactions, transactions by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran, specialized financial messaging services to banks and Iranian financial institutions and
the provision of underwriting services of insurance all have impacted
Iran’s economy.41
The United States has granted some exemptions to the sanc42
tions. Iran’s biggest oil customers, China and India, will not be penalized for purchasing petroleum from Iran until at least May 2019,43 as long
reductions in the amount of oil obtained can be demonstrated.44 Even
despite the exemptions, Iran is feeling the impacts of U.S. forces.45
The Iranian rial, the currency of the country, has suffered signif46
icantly. Throughout 2018, the rial lost more than 60% of its value.47
38. Ted Regencia, What Sanctions Will the US Reimpose Against Iran on Tuesday,
ALJAZEERA (Aug, 6, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/sanctions-iran-snaptuesday-180804193910915.html.
39. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING THE REIMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO THE MAY 8, 2018 NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM RELATING TO THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) 1-2
(2018).
40. Id. at 2-3.
41. Id.
42. Gardiner Harris, U.S. Reimposes Sanctions on Iran but Undercuts the Pain With
Waivers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/world/middleeast/us-iran-sanctions-oil-waivers.html.
43. See Tom DiChristopher, Trump Administration Still Might Let Iran Export Oil, and
That
Could
Lower
Prices,
CNBC
(Jan.
15,
2019,
12:00
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/15/trump-administration-leaves-the-door-open-to-lettingiran-export-oil.html (“The State Department’s envoy to Iran is declining to say whether Washington will force oil buyers to cut off purchases of Iranian crude later this year.”).
44. See id. (“The waivers are designed to allow countries to continue buying Iranian
crude so long as they demonstrate they are reducing their purchases.”).
45. Krauss, supra note 1.
46. Iran’s Central Bank Proposes Slashing Four Zeros from Falling Currency, REUTERS
(Jan. 6, 2018, 6:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-currency/irans-centralbank-proposes-slashing-four-zeros-from-falling-currency-irna-idUSKCN1P008C.
47. Id.
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The state of Iranian currency is so poor that in January 2019 the Central
Bank of Iran presented a bill to the government to remove four zeros from
the rial in an attempt to counteract hyperinflation.48 Additionally, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) estimated that Iran’s economy had
shrunk by 1.5% in 2018, likely to be worsened by the 3.6% drop estimated to occur in 2019.49
The country’s oil and banking industries also continue to face
hardship as international entities are largely unwilling to work with Iran
and risk U.S. sanctions.50 The return of sanctions results in a lost opportunity for economic engagement for the Islamic Republic on an international level,51 and Iran has warned that it will pull out of the JCPOA and
restart its nuclear program if the remaining members of the deal fail to
take action which serves Iran’s national economic interests.52
III. THE EU’S OBJECTIVES IN PURSUING A MULTIFACETED APPROACH TO
KEEP THE JCPOA INTACT
European policymakers were motivated to act quickly in order to
maintain the JCPOA after the United States announced that it would be
withdrawing from the agreement.53 From the European perspective, sustaining economic exchange and credit investment with Iran is driven
more by pragmatic security concerns than advancing EU economic
gains,54 though some European companies have benefited from working
within Iran.55
48. Id.
49. See IMF Data Mapper, INT’L MONETARY FUND (2018), https://www.imf.org/exter-

nal/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/RN (last visited
Feb. 8, 2019) (demonstrating IMF predictions regarding Iran’s economy via an interactive
tool).
50. Gladstone, supra note 36.
51. A New Banking Architecture, supra note 18, at 1.
52. Michael Peel, Alex Barker, & Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Iran Threatens to Withdraw from
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, FIN. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/6dda41ac-6020-11e8-9334-2218e7146b04.
53. See Bryan R. Early, E.U. Countries Want to Save the Nuclear Deal. Don’t Expect
Cooperation on U.S. Sanctions, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/25/e-u-countries-want-to-save-the-iran-nuclear-deal-dont-expect-cooperation-on-u-s-sanctions/?utm_term=.b5c95ddaa362 (“The E.U.
energy chief reassured Iranian officials that Europe would continue to honor the 2015 Iran
nuclear agreement — despite the U.S. announcement this month that it would exit the agreement.”).
54. A New Banking Architecture, supra note 18, at 1.
55. See Wald, supra note 3 (describing companies that had success investing in Iran under the JCPOA that are now being forced to leave the Islamic Republic).
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At first, the EU was confident in its ability to limit the impact of
U.S. sanctions.56 Prior to the sanctions imposed under the Obama Administration, Iran was able to trade with third-party entities subsequently
evading U.S. efforts to isolate the country from economic exchange.57 It
was only after the EU agreed to work with the United States by imposing
penalties against Iran for sanction violations that the sanctions began to
have any “bite.”58
The Trump Administration was hoping to recreate the joint economic pressure that led to the negotiation of the JCPOA.59 However, immediately after Trump announced that sanctions would be returning, the
EU pledged their full commitment to Iran and the JCPOA.60 The EU
specifically promised to “mitigate the impact of [U.S.] sanctions on European businesses”61 and planned to take steps to continue the international business relations between the EU and Iran.62
The EU’s initially planned response consisted of measures intended to act on three main fronts with the common objective of securing
and sustaining Iranian economic growth.63 Targeted measures pursued
by the EU were: (1) paving the way for an alternative means of financing
business transactions through the European Investment Bank (“EIB”); (2)
encouraging member states to make direct bank transfers with the Central
Bank of Iran (“CBI”) in order to continue to facilitate oil-related transactions; and (3) launching a formal process to extend the EU blocking statute to cover the new U.S. measures.64

56. See Silvia Amaro, Europe Fights to Keep the Iran Nuclear Deal Intact After Trump
Pulls Out, CNBC (May 9, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/09/europe-fights-to-keepthe-iran-nuclear-deal-intact-after-trump-pulls-out.html (explaining the EU’s initial response
to Trump’s May 8th announcement that the U.S. would be leaving the JCPOA).
57. Early, supra note 53.
58. Early, supra note 53.
59. Early, supra note 53.
60. See European Comm’n Press Release, European Commission Acts to Protect the Interests of EU Companies Investing in Iran as part of the EU’s Continued Commitment to the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (May 18, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP18-3861_en.htm (“European Commission acts to protect the interests of EU companies investing in Iran as part of the EU’s continued commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action.”).
61. Id.
62. See id. (“The [EU] is committed to mitigating the impact . . . and taking steps to
maintain the growth of trade and economic relations between the EU and Iran that began when
sanctions were lifted. This can only be achieved by a combination of measures taken at national and European level.”).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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However, even before the second wave of Trump Administration
sanctions were put into effect, the failure of the EU’s economic plan
seemed inevitable.65 First, the EIB announced in July 2018 that the
agency would refuse to lend to Iran.66 Second, the hesitation of European
national banks to work directly with Iran was reinforced by the Islamic
Republic’s unwillingness to comply with global anti-terror standards.67
Third, it became apparent that the gaps within the EU’s blocking statute
made its interpretation vague and its force essentially non-existent.68
IV. THE INEVITABLE FAILURE OF THE EU’S INITIAL STRATEGY
A. European Investment Bank’s Refusal to Lend to Iran
Since liquidity is a significant issue in Iran,69 European officials
assumed that the EIB would be able to support small- to medium- sized
Iranian companies to offset the impact of the U.S. sanctions.70 However,
the EIB has refused to lend to Iran.71 This refusal is for two main reasons.
First, the EIB worries that any relationship with Iran would jeopardize the organization’s U.S. relations.72 After the United States

65. John Irish & Robin Emmott, As U.S. Sanctions Near, Europe Fails to Protect Iran
Deal, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2018, 11:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nucleareu/as-u-s-sanctions-near-europe-fails-to-protect-iran-deal-idUSKCN1M41UO.
66. European Investment Bank Balks at Proposal to Offset U.S. Iran Sanctions,
JERUSALEM POST (June 5, 2018, 4:26 PM), https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/European-Investment-Bank-balks-at-proposal-to-offset-US-Iran-sanctions-559212.
67. Ruth Berschens, et al., EU Pressuring Central Banks to Help Iran, HANDELSBLATT
GLOBAL (May 29, 2018 at 11:58 AM), https://global.handelsblatt.com/finance/eu-pressuringcentral-banks-iran-928936.
68. GIBSON DUNN, THE “NEW” IRAN E.O. AND THE “NEW” EU BLOCKING STATUTE, (Aug.
9, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/new-iran-e-o-and-new-eu-blocking-statute-navigating-the-divide-for-international-business.
69. Structural banking deficiencies and the explosion of semi-governmental organizations in Iran’s economy have resulted in the growth of liquidity held in bank accounts but this
growth has not been on conjunction with the economic realities, such as production capacity.
Additionally, the large pieces of the extra liquidity held in bank accounts have been moved
towards the non-productive sector and “immovable assets.” Hoorzan, Sanctions of LiquidityWhich One Is More Dangerous for Iran’s Economy?, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Oct. 10, 2018),
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/sanctions-or-liquidity-which-one-is-moredangerous-for-iran-s-economy.
70. Beatriz Rios, EIB Cannot Do Business with Iran, Bank Chief Warns, EURATIV (July
19, 2018), https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eib-cannot-do-businesswith-iran-bank-chief-warns.
71. Id.
72. Alissa de Carbonnel & Robin Emmott, Under U.S. Pressure, EIB balks at EU Plan
to Work in Iran, REUTERS (June 5, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-
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withdrew from the JCPOA, the EU quickly passed legislation to add Iran
to the list of countries in which the EIB was legally able to conduct business and subsequently began to pressure the EIB to find ways to support
Iran in light of the impending sanctions.73 Yet, even EU legislation could
not force the union’s own lending arm to work with Iran.74
If the EIB had succumbed to the EU’s pressure, the EIB would
have likely jeopardized its ability to raise money within U.S. markets.75
The inability to work within U.S. markets would result in significant
long-term consequences for EIB operations, as the EIB currently has
€500 billion in outstanding bonds76 with roughly one-third of its lending
operation dollar-denominated.77 The EIB raised $66 billion in 2017 on
international capital markets and reasonably worried that the threat of
U.S. sanctions against the EIB could scare off potential bond buyers.78
Although the EU did budget a guarantee that would attempt to shield the
entity against any losses derived from sanctions, they failed to offer a
solution for the EIB to address funding risks.79
Second, any engagement with Iran would risk the business model
on which the EIB was formed.80 The EIB does not engage in jurisdictions
categorized by the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”)81 as “high
risk.”82 FATF expected Iran to quickly pass strict legislation to combat
money laundering, especially in the midst of the re-imposition of U.S.
sanctions, but hardliners in Iran’s Parliament were deeply opposed to ushering in an era of global compliance and stalled any attempts to satisfy

nuclear-europe-exclusive/exclusive-under-us-pressure-eib-balks-at-eu-plan-to-work-in-iranidUSKCN1J11J3.
73. Robin Emmott & Alissa de Carbonnel, European Investment Bank Casts Doubt on
EU plan to Salvage Nuclear Deal, REUTERS (July 18, 2018, 7:04 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/18/reuters-america-update-1-european-investment-bankcannot-invest-in-iran-eib-chief-says.html. [hereinafter EIB Casts Doubt].
74. Rios, supra note 70.
75. de Carbonnel & Emmott, supra note 72.
76. EIB Casts Doubt, supra note 73.
77. de Carbonnel & Emmott, supra note 72.
78. de Carbonnel & Emmott, supra note 72.
79. de Carbonnel & Emmott, supra note 72.
80. EIB Casts Doubt, supra note 73.
81. See FATF, WHO WE ARE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about (last visited Feb. 8, 2019)
(“FATF is an inter-governmental body that has developed a series of recommendations currently recognized as the international standard for combating money laundering, the financing
of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”).
82. de Carbonnel & Emmott, supra note 72.
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FATF requirements.83 The strong opposition was mainly due to the fact
that the implementation of FATF regulations would significantly hamper
Iranian support for allied groups, including United States designated terrorist entities.84
FATF originally had given Iran until October 2018 to either implement new standards to end the Islamic Republic’s support for terror
financing or face the consequences of being “blacklisted”85 by the organization.86 This threat did fuel the passage of an anti-terror funding bill in
the Iranian Parliament, but as FATF members only review fully-enacted
legislation, Iran failed to meet the October deadline.87
FATF did agree to extend extra time to Iran to complete reforms
that would bring the country into line with global norms, but it currently
remains unclear if Iran will be able to avoid pariah-status.88 Even if Iran
can prevent the most extreme of FATF’s force, the country’s inability to
move swiftly away from terror financing has undoubtedly worked to solidify the fears of companies who are hesitant about working with Iran,
including the EIB.89
B. European Central Bank’s Unwillingness to Aid Iran in the
Purchasing of Oil
After the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, European officials were quick to maintain a commitment to Iran for the purchase oil,
and this allegiance was extended by officials guaranteeing direct

83. Najmeh Bozorgmher, Iran’s Parliament Votes to Ratify UN Anti-Terror Funding
Treaty, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/1aa2a208-ca20-11e8-9fe524ad351828ab.
84. See id. (“Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani said . . . the FATF ‘is surely a dangerous thing’, which might prevent Iran from supporting its proxy forces in the region, notably
Lebanon’s Hizbollah and Yemen’s Houthis.”).
85. A place on FATF’s blacklist would cement the reluctance of foreign investors and
banks in dealing with Iran and could essentially ensure that European efforts to keep some
financial channels open to Iran all but impossible. Anti-Money-Laundering Body Gives Iran
Until Feb to Complete Reforms, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2018, 8:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-moneylaundering/anti-money-laundering-body-gives-iran-until-febto-complete-reforms-idUSKCN1MT1OT.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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payments from Europe to Iran.90 EU member states were subsequently
pressured to bypass the U.S. financial system by dealing with oil purchases from Iran exclusively in euros.91 For the purchase of oil to be
feasible in euros, the central banks of Europe would have to transfer large
sums directly to Iran’s central bank.92
This facet of the EU’s plan was based on a notion that the United
States would not be willing to sanction the central bank of an EU member
state given the consequences that would likely follow.93 However, European central banks were much more hesitant to test the force behind
Trump’s sanction enforcement threats.94
The European Central Bank refused to directly transfer money to
Tehran, alleging that such money transfers are incompatible with their
mandate,95 and individual European national central banks are likely to
follow suit.96 European national central banks are simply not likely to
oblige to the EU’s request, and the EU does not have the authority to
force their compliance.97 Additionally, European national central banks
share the EIB’s and FATF’s concerns of indirectly aiding money laundering or the funding of terrorism by transferring money to Iran’s Central
Bank.98 European officials have not yet found a way to ease these fears.
99

C. The Impractical Assertion of the Blocking Statute
Shortly after the United States announced it would be re-implementing sanctions, the European Commission began the formal process
of activating the European Union’s blocking statute.100 The blocking
90. Ruth Berschens, et al., EU Pressuring Central Banks to Help Iran, HANDELSBLATT
GLOBAL (May 29, 2018, 11:58 AM), https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/finance/creativesolutions-eu-pressuring-central-banks-to-help-iran/23582276.html.
91. Berschens, et al., supra note 90.
92. Berschens, et al., supra note 90.
93. Josh Lederman & Dan De Luce, How Europe Plans to Skirt Trump’s Sanctions and
Keep Doing Business with Iran, NBC NEWS (Sep, 4, 2018, 11:04 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/how-europe-plans-skirt-trump-s-sanctions-keep-doing-business-n906161.
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statute was first adopted by the EU in 1996 in response to U.S. sanctions
against Cuba and has historically only been activated to serve as a political warning to the United States.101 The recent amending process revisited the current list of blocking statute provisions to add protections on
behalf of the European companies that have, or plan to, invest in Iran.102
The current version of the blocking statute is meant to protect
European entities by theoretically creating an obligation for companies to
alert the European Commission within 30 days should their economic or
financial interests be negatively impacted, directly or indirectly, by U.S.
sanctions.103 In the case that EU nationals and companies do have their
interests adversely affected, the statute provides a right to recover lost
compensation.104 The statute also bans the recognition of any court judgment or decision that gives effect to U.S. Iranian sanction law105 and prohibits EU organizations and persons from complying with U.S. sanctions.106
However, the EU presently does not have enough strength to
make the blocking statute a useful tool in combating the impact of U.S.
sanctions,107 given the great deal of legal uncertainty surrounding the statute.108 Certain provisions of the blocking statute are ambiguous, and
there is consensus regarding the lack of practical application of the statute.109
For example, the “right to compensation”110 clause could lead to
a great deal of litigation between contracting business entities.111 Proving
(2018),https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ%3AC%3A2018%3A277I%3ATOC&uri=uriserv%3AOJ.CI.2018.
277.01.0004.01.ENG [hereinafter EU Guidance Note].
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. EU Guidance Note, supra note 100.
106. EU Guidance Note, supra note 100.
107. See Steven Erlanger, Europe, Again Humiliated by Trump, Struggles to Defend Its
Interests, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/world/europe/europe-iran-trump.html (stating that the blocking statute “would not entirely reassure companies
that also trade with the United States”).
108. GIBSON DUNN, THE “NEW” IRAN E.O. AND THE “NEW” EU BLOCKING STATUTE (Aug.
9, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/new-iran-e-o-and-new-eu-blocking-statute-navigating-the-divide-for-international-business.
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110. EU Guidance Note, supra note 100.
111. ROBERT MEADE & JOSH ZIVE, BRACEWELL LLP, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND THE
ENERGY SECTION- PART 1: IRAN (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/international-sanctions-and-the-energy-91302.
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that one party terminated a contract as a result of U.S. sanctions to trigger
the actual right to compensation would be difficult.112 Unless of course,
the exiting party specifically stated they were withdrawing from the relationship due to the U.S. sanctions.113
Further, the blocking statute, as currently constructed, puts EU
companies that invested in a post-JCPOA Iran in a tricky position.114 If
an entity continued business with Iran in breach of the sanctions, the business would be cut off from the entirety of the U.S. financial system.115
Yet if the company decided to leave Iran as a result of the sanctions, they
would breach the blocking statute and be subsequently subject to EU penalties.116
Failure of the blocking statute to protect EU based companies extends past organizations with specific ties to U.S. markets.117 The EU has
repeatedly discussed finding ways to support small- or medium -sized
Iranian or EU enterprises that have limited or no exposure to U.S. financial markets.118 It has been suggested that supporting these sized entities
could continue Iran’s economic growth, possibly keeping the Islamic Republic complaint to the standards set by the nuclear agreement.119 However, the success of small- or medium- sized organizations in maintaining
the JCPOA, despite their independence from the U.S. financial market,
seems unlikely given the blocking statute’s lack of protections.120 Even
organizations with no interest in penetrating the U.S. market place may
face significant difficulty in finding business partners, or financial backing, to support their efforts.121
V. A NEW SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE: INSTEX
On January 31, 2019, INSTEX (Instrument for Supporting Trade
Exchanges) became a registered SPV with France, Germany and the
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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United Kingdom (the “E3”) as initial shareholders.122 Given that the first
tier of sanction blocking efforts failed,123 the EU decided it was in its best
interest to create a new entity that would make it possible for companies
to trade with Iran.124 The SPV is devised to facilitate financial transactions and trade between European companies and Iran.125 Eventually, the
SPV could be opened to other partners in the world.”126 INSTEX was
registered in France and will be supervised by a Franco-German delegation chaired by former Commerzbank Governor Per Fischer.127
INSTEX will focus “initially on the sectors most essential to the
Iranian population, such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and [food]
goods.”128 The United States does not sanction these goods,129 but European banks have not facilitated exports of these products due to fears of
American retribution.130 Applications of INSTEX may increase as the
SPV shows its value, potentially being used to facilitate the trade of U.S.
sanctioned commodities.131

122. European Union Press Release, Statement by High Representative/Vice-President
Federica Mogherini on the creation of INSTEX, Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges
(Jan. 31, 2019).
123. The EU kept delaying the promise to create a SPV mainly because it was difficult to
find a country to host the vehicle. Jones Hayden & Golnar Motevalli, EU Says Preparations
for Iran SPV are at ‘Advanced Stage,’ BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2019, 7:54AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-24/eu-says-preparations-for-iran-spvare-at-advanced-stage.
124. INSTEX: Europe Sets up Transactions Channel With Iran, DW (Jan., 31, 2019),
https://www.dw.com/en/instex-europe-sets-up-transactions-channel-with-iran/a-47303580
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At this time, technical details on INSTEX are still being determined.
However, though SPV’s are most commonly known for their
role in securitizing property-based assets,133 INSTEX would likely work
by offering a “compensation” service that coordinates payments between
entities operating within the Islamic Republic.134 INSTEX could be specifically devised to facilitate transactions between European importers
and exporters with ties to Iran, eliminating the necessity for any crossborder payments.135 For example, a European exporter of goods to Iran
would be able to have their payments coordinated by INSTEX so the exporter would be able to be paid by a European organization working as
an importer of goods from Iran.136 Ultimately this means that exporters
would be paid from funds outside of Iran while importers would be paid
by the funds within Iran.137
No matter what technical form INSTEX takes, the SPV’s primary
goals should remain centered around humanitarian purposes.138 Though
trade within the essential goods market will not result in a significant financial boost for the Islamic Republic, INSTEX may be enough to keep
Iran content for a little longer while the European bloc continues to devise
alternative methods to protect the Iranian economy.139
Having essential goods promised by INSTEX could keep the Iranian government from withdrawing from the JCPOA, at least in the immediate future, for two main reasons. First, an increase in essential goods
could foster a greater sense of Iranian civility.140 In the past year, Iranians
have taken to the streets almost daily to protest the government regarding
the poor working and living conditions in the country141 and the re-establishment of sanctions has only progressively worsened Iranian civil
132

132. Batmanghelidj, supra note 130 (discussing how it will take months for the SPV to
become fully operational).
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unrest.142 Essential supplies in Iran143 are so scarce that doctors at the
MAHAK Pediatric Cancer and Treatment Research Center warned in November 2018 that by the end of January 2019, medicine shortages at the
hospital would prevent the proper treatment of many children suffering
from various types of cancers.144 Finding a way to restock the shelves
with medicine, foods, and other essential products could give Iran the
boost it so desperately needs to tamper down civilian unrest and continue
JCPOA compliance.145
Further, INSTEX, as announced, is theoretically immune to U.S.
sanctions.146 If the U.S. tried to sanction INSTEX, the Trump Administration would have to explain why a channel providing medicines to
Iran went against U.S. sanction policy and was not subject to an exemption.147 Denying medicine and food to sick children could be a public
relations disaster for the Trump Administration.
Second, INSTEX is meant to signal to Iran that the EU is truly
committed to the preservation of the JCPOA.148 Given that Iran has
grown frustrated with the EU’s inability to follow through on any of its
sanction avoiding proposals, INSTEX could ensure that Iran continues to
adhere to the regulations set by the nuclear agreement.149 It is possible
that INSTEX could also signal that alternate SPVs could be created to
facilitate other activities, such as exporting oil, in the future.150
Future SPVs may be used to create “gateway banks.”151 A joint
report by Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Axel Hellman for the European
Leadership Network argued that gateway banks could be part of the

142. See Tim Murphy, Power, Politics and Pride in Iran, NEWSROOM (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://www.newsroom.co.nz/@summer-newsroom/2019/01/06/75997/long-read-powerpolitics-and-pride-in-iran (“The unspoken deal in such situations is that the public may tolerate restrictions on personal freedoms so long as the authorities deliver better living conditions,
jobs, homes and security.”).
143. See Batmanghelidj & Hellman, supra note 8 (“Humanitarian trade, which includes
food items, agricultural commodities, medicine and medical supplies, is broadly accepted to
be exempt from sanctions, as is trade in most consumer goods.”).
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146. Batmanghelidj & Hellman, supra note 8.
147. Batmanghelidj & Hellman, supra note 8.
148. Press Release, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, New Mechanism to Facilitate
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viable solution the EU can pursue to avoid U.S. sanctions effectively.152
Gateway banks are “financial institutions which can serve as intermediaries between major Iranian and European commercial banks.”153 These
gateway banks act as “intermediaries to international financial institutions” from other countries wanting to work with Iran, such as China and
Russia.154 EU officials have seemingly given credit to the idea and have
stated that it is a possibility that SPVs could be granted a banking license.155 This method could make it more likely that the EU would be
able to reach the oil sector once again, but gateway banks would have to
be supported by other changes in EU infrastructure.156
There are many basic uncertainties about INSTEX the E3 will
need to address in the coming months before it becomes finalized.157 The
E3 will need to clarify which type of activities are permissible.158 The
E3 will have to provide assurance that companies using INSTEX are legally protected against U.S. action.159 Additionally, the E3 will need to
decide how much autonomy INSTEX will have and what level of transparency the SPV must communicate.160 It will also be important for the
E3 to figure out what exact role European governments are expected to
play in financially supporting European commerce with Iran.161
VI. CONCLUSION
Many potential consequences accompany the implementation of
INSTEX.162 Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, warned that the creation
of such an SPV would be “one of the most counterproductive measures

152.
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imaginable for regional and global peace and security.”163 While the announced format of INSTEX does not outwardly pose a high level of risk,
it is possible that an SPV used for the transaction of other goods, such as
oil, could not guarantee the same protections provided by commodities
exchanged through U.S. supported entities.164 Given that SPV’s would
require the support of new oversight protocol, it is possible terror-related,
or money laundering activity could slip through the cracks.165
There are other significant issues for the United States if the EU
does establish a far-reaching SPV system beyond that of INSTEX.166 If
SPVs are used to create a financial network that can bypass U.S. markets,
U.S. financial dominance may be undermined.167 If U.S. financial dominance is weakened, it will be less likely that the United States will be
able to successfully impose and enforce unilateral sanctions moving forward.168
However, it is possible that the EU’s efforts to sustain the JCPOA
could soon become moot.169 Reports are starting to surface from Iran that
government officials have “lost trust” in the ability for Europeans to implement a strategy significant enough to keep Iran interested in staying as
part of the peace treaty.170 Fears that Iran will become impatient with
European strategies to salvage Iran’s economy and withdraw from the
JCPOA to restart their nuclear program have been exacerbated by the recent attempted Iranian group hacking of many nuclear scientist’s data.171
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If the EU hopes to continue to keep Iran from returning to the of nuclear
their commitment to salvage the JCPOA, INSTEX may not be enough.172
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